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CONCEPTIONS OF AUTHORITY
AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW DIVIDE
Dan Priel*
Forthcoming American Journal of Comparative Law (2016/17)
Abstract: This essay seeks to explain the puzzle of the divergence of American law from the
rest of the common law world through the lens of legal theory. I argue that there are four
competing ideal-type theories of the authority of the common law: reason, practice, custom,
and will. The reason view explains the authority of the common law in terms of
correspondence to the demands of pure practical reason; the practice view sees the authority
of the common law as derived from the expertise of practitioners (especially judges and
practice-oriented academics) who try to develop the common law as a slowly-changing,
historically-binding tradition; the custom view sees the authority of the common law as
derived from its correspondence to contemporaneous norms and values; and the will view sees
the authority of the common law (like that of all other law) as derived from the acts of a
sovereign. These competing views imply different answers to various questions (such as the
relationship between statutes and the common law, or the role of judges in the legal system).
They also lead to very different attitudes towards the idea of a single, supranational common
law: generally speaking, the first two approaches are more sympathetic to common law
convergence than the latter two. I argue that these days English common law is close to the
second, practice-based, conception of common law authority, whereas American law adopts a
combination of the third and fourth conceptions. This explains why American common law is
largely uninterested in maintaining commonality with other common law jurisdictions, as well
as many other differences between American and English common law.

I. The End of the Affair
In the annals of odd ideas there surely is an entry for a suggestion made by Albert
Venn Dicey in a forgotten essay he published in 1897. In that essay he suggested “a
common citizenship for all Englishmen and Americans.”1 To a contemporary reader
part of why this is surprising has to do with the identity of its author. Dicey is
*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School (dpriel@osgoode.yorku.ca). An early version of this
essay was presented in the Obligations VII conference at the University of Hong Kong held in July 2014,
and I thank participants there for their comments and questions. I would also like to thank participants
in the Comparative Law Works in Progress Workshop held at Princeton University, and especially to my
commentators James Whitman and Peter Dachin, for their comments and suggestions for the paper.
Finally, I also thank the editors and two anonymous referees for The American Journal of Comparative Law
for their comments and suggestions.
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2769302

nowadays considered the quintessentially English, a legal scholar whose ideas are
inherently tied to English law.2 Why would he want a common citizenship with the
United States? The bigger puzzle, of course, is the idea itself. What on earth was
Dicey thinking?
Admitting that the idea “must of necessity sound startling,” he nevertheless
sought to show that it was both “practicable,” and “wholly good.”3 To show that, he
proposed that “an Act of the Imperial Parliament should make every citizen of the
United States, during the continuance of peace between England and America, a
British subject, and that simultaneously an Act of Congress should make every British
subject, during the continuance of such peace, a citizen of the United States.”4 He
evidently gave the matter considerable thought, because much of the essay is
dedicated to addressing various practical problems that might arise in the context of
marriage and divorce, elections and voting, the execution of wills, and much else.
Though Dicey stressed that the joint citizenship did not imply national or political
unity,5 he thought that “[c]ommon citizenship…may well lead to permanent
alliance”6 between the United States and Britain. And though at that point he
focused only on these two countries, Dicey did not rule out the possibility of
ultimately “exten[ding] of common civil and political rights throughout the whole of
the English-speaking people.”7
The reason I mention this historical curiosity is because of the central reason
Dicey gave in support of it was the two countries’ shared legal tradition. What he
wrote sounds, by today’s standards, so off-the-wall, that it deserves a lengthy quote:
An English lawyer is the natural advocate of isopolity, for no one can so well appreciate the
fundamental identity of English and American law, and all that this identity implies. An
English barrister who lands for the first time at New York feels for a moment that he is a
stranger in a strange country, the strangeness of which is increased, rather than diminished,
by the fact that its inhabitants speak the tongue of England; but when once he enters an
American court, or begins debating legal questions with American lawyers, he knows that he
is not abroad, but at home; he breathes again the legal atmosphere to which he is
accustomed. The law of America, he finds, is the law of England carried across the Atlantic,
and little changed even in form. In all legal matters it is the conservatism, not the
changeableness, of Americans which astonishes an English observer. Old names and old
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See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 149 (“Dicey
on the rule of law is…untranslatable, not because his words are English but because the very thought
being communicated is inextricably bound up with English institutions”).
3
Dicey, supra note 1, at 458.
4
Id. at 457.
5
Id. at 457–58.
6
Id. at 472; see also id. at 467 (“common citizenship may well stimulate first co-operation and then
alliance”).
7
Id. at 458.
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formulas meet us in every law court. Some twenty-six years ago there were to be found in
Chicago in daily use forms of pleading which had long become obsolete in England.
Nowhere can one discover such choice specimens both of legal learning and of legal
conservatism as among the judges or lawyers of Pennsylvania, Vermont or Massachusetts. We
may be certain that men like Lord Selborne, Lord Westbury, or Lord Cairns shocked some of
the ablest among American lawyers by their zeal for legal improvements or innovations.
Then, too, authorities and precedents are cited by Americans, just as they are cited by
ourselves, and as they never are cited by any French advocate or magistrate. The names,
moreover, which carry weight are the names to which we are accustomed. Coke, Hale,
Mansfield, and Blackstone are as well known, and at least as much reverenced, in
Massachusetts as in England. Kent and Story, in like manner, are as much respected in an
English as in an American court. Nor is the interchange of legal ideas in any sense a matter of
the past. The monumental work of my friends Sir F. Pollock and Professor Maitland is
studied with as much care and admiration at Harvard as at Cambridge or Oxford. One may
confidently assert that the “History of English Law,” or Sir William Anson’s “Law of
Contract,” finds more readers in the United States than in England. The writings, on the
other hand, of Holmes, Thayer, or of Bigelow, are in the hands of every Englishman
interested in the scientific or historical study of law. Nor is the fact that Englishmen and
Americans partake of and contribute to a common legal literature, and that the common law
of England is the heritage of the whole English race, a matter of which it is possible to
overrate the significance. When at some distant period thinkers sum up the results of English
as they now sum up the results of Grecian or of Roman civilisation, they will, we may
anticipate, hold that its main permanent effect has been the diffusion throughout the whole
world of the law of England, together with those notions of freedom, of justice, and of equity
to which English law gives embodiment.8

Dicey then added:
Let my readers try to realise the greatness of English achievements in the field of law, for
they will then feel that Englishmen in England and Englishmen in America have taken, and
are taking, an equal part in the great work of the whole English race, and that their common
success in this common effort arises from their possessing the same conceptions of legal
order and of legal justice. Here, if anywhere, may be seen community of sentiment and
convictions. Common citizenship is the logical, one might almost say the necessary, result of
the inheritance of a common law.9

Others, even when not going so far as to suggest a joint citizenship, expressed rather
similar views about the similarity between English and American law.10 Around the
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Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 471. For the historical context of these views see text accompanying notes __, infra.
10
In England, Frederick Pollock was not far behind Dicey when he wrote (apparently in all
seriousness) that “[l]awyers may…regret[] that the hostilities which at one time actually took place
between the United States and the French Republic were not prolonged or not serious enough to bring
about an Anglo-American alliance.” FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 4–5
(1904); see also James Bryce, The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the
9
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same time Dicey published his essay John Dillon, a prominent American legal scholar
and judge,11 published a book entitled Law and Jurisprudence of England and America,
based on the Storrs Lectures he delivered at Yale. Dicey would have undoubtedly
assented to what Dillon had to say about the relationship between English and
American law. Again, it is worth quoting him at some length:
The common law affiliates the legal systems of England and the United States, and also the
legal system of all of the other States of the Union. It makes them all akin. It gives them an
organic character. It is a living bond of union, since it is the cause and medium of a constant
and active intercommunication and intercourse, making the people of the whole country
neighbors.12
Our system of laws and jurisprudence is consonant with the genius of our people and with
our civil and political institutions;…it is an outgrowth of them, and powerfully supports and
sustains them. It is, in its ground-work, the system that prevails wherever, on either
continent, our language is spoken. In our law libraries we find the learning and labors of
judges administering this system in law reports from India, South Africa, Australia, New
Zealand, the Dominion of Canada, the Sandwich Islands, and the West Indies. All this is the
heritage, by what I may call a species of tenancy in common, of the English and American
lawyer, who wherever, within this wide horizon, he finds his language spoken, finds also
individual and civil liberty, popular institutions, the grand and petit jury, legislative
assemblies, Magna Charta, Habeas Corpus, equality before the law, the same sacred regard
for individual rights, the same reverential affection for, and instinctive obedience to law.
What incalculable advantages! We have the same legal literature. We have the same legal
firmament, in which we behold Hale and Marshall, Hardwicke and Story, Blackstone and
Kent, Erskine and Webster. We partake freely of the benefits of the labors of each other.
Whoever achieves anything for the advancement or improvement of the law, achieves it not
for his own country alone, but for all English-speaking and English-governed peoples.13

A century later Richard Posner, another prominent American legal scholar and judge,
published a book with an almost identical title, based on the Clarendon Lectures he
delivered at Oxford. It is replete with comments indicating that the gulf between
English and American law is vast. The differences Posner mentioned included the
structure of the legal profession, the place of law in society, the prevailing approach to
adjudication and the style of judicial opinions, the boldness of the judiciary, the
Development of the Common Law, 24 LAW Q. REV. 9, 10 (1908) (“the Common Law is a common possession
of the United States and of England because that spirit and those tendencies and those mental habits
which belonged to the English stock when it was still undivided have been preserved until now”). The
dying gasps of this view, including a reference to “the law of the English peoples,” are found in Roscoe
Pound, The Development of American Law and Its Deviation from English Law, 67 LAW Q. REV. 49, 65–66
(1951). Pound was eighty at the time.
11
See John Forrest Dillon, Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forrest_Dillon.
12
JOHN F. DILLON, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 156 (1894).
13
Id. at 193–94.
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receptiveness of the legal profession to social science, the prevailing legal philosophy,
and more. His conclusion was that the “two legal systems…appear to have diverged
considerably since the nineteenth century, let alone the eighteenth.”14 An earlier and
more comprehensive comparative study of English and American law (co-authored by
an American and an Englishman) reached similar conclusions. After an extensive
examination of the two legal systems, they concluded that they embodied two
different “visions of law.”15 They found the differences between the two legal
systems so profound that it led them to doubt the idea of universal jurisprudence.
Instead, they argued for “jurisprudential relativism,” the view that “legal phenomena
cannot be understood, and ought not to be studied, apart from the context in which
they operate.”16
One indication of the divergence is the degree of interaction between the two
jurisdictions. Starting with academic culture, consider the early days of the Law
Quarterly Review and the Harvard Law Review, founded within a couple of years of
each other. In those early days it was not uncommon to find English legal academics,
especially from Oxford, publishing in the Harvard Law Review; and though less
frequently (perhaps because Americans soon had a large number of homegrown
journals), there were also prominent American jurists publishing in the Law Quarterly
Review. Nowadays, not only are Americans conspicuously absent from the pages of the
latter just as English scholars are absent from the former, these journals look like they
belong to different disciplines.
Turning to teaching materials, Langdell’s famous contracts casebook included
dozens of English cases; Pollock’s tort textbook discussed many American cases, and
often urged English courts to adopt novel doctrines found in them.17 Such
transatlantic cross-references are much rarer today.
Even in the academic study of legal history, where one would not expect to see
such a gulf, we see a remarkable (and remarkably similar) divergence between
English and American scholars. David Rabban has recently noted that unlike the
nineteenth century, when legal historians from both countries shared methods and
aims, by the late twentieth century there was a marked divide in the field with
14

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 106 (1996).
P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 411–15 (1987);
see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 36–37.
16
ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 419; see also Dan Priel, Is There One Right Answer to the
Question of the Nature of Law?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 322 (Wil
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2012).
17
See NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION 225 (2004). As
Duxbury shows, Pollock’s books were also frequently cited by contemporaneous American courts. See id.
at 225.
15
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scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic “proceed[ing] on independent tracks.” The
difference was so pronounced that “to the limited extent that the Americans have
even been aware of the recent English legal historians at all, they have often treated
their work with bafflement or condescension.”18
This divergence is not just confined to the academic world. As Dicey mentioned,
American courts used to cite English cases and scholarship relatively frequently, but
rarely do so anymore;19 in England, especially in private law, citation of American
cases is less common than citation to Canadian and especially Australian cases, even
though the pool of available American cases is much larger.20
When did this divergence take place? Oliver Wendell Holmes provides some
helpful pointers. In the same year Dicey published his essay calling for AngloAmerican citizenship, Holmes delivered the address we now know as The Path of the
Law. When he spoke there of the “means of the study” of law, he referred to “a body
of reports, of treatises, and of statutes, in this country and in England.”21 Thirty years
later, the very same Holmes, an unabashed Anglophile who once wrote in a letter that
“England is my crowd,”22 presented a very different view in one of his famous
Supreme Court dissents:
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit, cite cases from this
Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from the State Courts, from England and the
Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticise them as right or wrong according to the
writer’s notions of a single theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one
august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there
were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within
it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in
using their independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The
fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be
found. Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts
18

DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC
TURN TO HISTORY 535 (2013).
19
See, e.g., William H. Manz, Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (2001) (“there has been absolutely no interest in contemporary British
opinions. The few cited [British] cases are invariably quite old, and are included for historical reasons.”);
William H. Manz, Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: 1850–1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121,
132–33 (1995) (same); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation,
33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 799 (1981) (“In 1870–1900 a foreign (primarily English) case was cited in only
15.3% of [state supreme court] cases;…in 1940–1970 there were none.”).
20
See Peter Clinch, The Use of Authority: Citation Patterns in the English Courts, 46 J. DOCUMENTATION
287, 298 (1990) (American cases were cited only in 0.5% of cases).
21
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
22
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein, Oct. 12, 1914, in THE HOLMES–EINSTEIN
LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903–1935, at 100, 100
(James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964).
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speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law
so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to
what it may have been in England or anywhere else.…Whether and how far and in what
sense a rule shall be adopted whether called common law or Kentucky law is for the State
alone to decide.23

A decade later, these words were adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.24
Legislation provides another illustration of a similar shift, taking place within a
similar timeframe. The Uniform Sales Act of 1906 was modeled on the British Sale of
Goods Act of 1893. Less than half a century later, the Uniform Commercial Code was
conceived as a wholly American creation. It adopted a novel terminology and made no
effort to retain any strong links with the commercial law of the rest of the common
law world. The old guard criticized this change,25 but by then this seemed like a
quaint concern. (Karl Llewellyn played a central role in the formulation of the Code,
especially of Article 2 that deals with sales. This, as we shall see, is not insignificant.)
Historical processes rarely begin or end abruptly, but these events provide
convenient temporal boundaries for the inquiry. It was sometime in the period
between 1935 and 1945 that the two legal systems drifted apart. With this rough
timeframe, the puzzle this essay seeks to explain can be presented as follows: Why is
it that two legal systems sharing one historical origin and which early in the twentieth
century were thought to be close enough to merit considering joint citizenship,
diverged so quickly? At first sight the timing of the change lends itself to a ready
answer: legal realism.26 The familiar story is that it radically and irrevocably changed
the way Americans thought about law; English lawyers, however, remained at best
indifferent to its charms.27 After the realist revolution Americans no longer saw any
23

Black & White Taxicab Co. v Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533–34 (1928) (Holmes
J., dissenting). In Holmes’s mind this conception of authority was connected to the physical limits of
political power. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909).
24
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
25
See Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV.
561, 564 (1950) (“When the American [Sales] Act was drafted it was thought to be of considerable
advantage that the statute so closely resembled the English statute….It is surprising, when the scope of
the world is now narrowed by increased speed of transportation…that the advantage of similarity to the
English law should be so lightly cast aside.”).
26
This answer is suggested, for example, in Robert Stevens, Basic Concepts and Current Differences in
English and American Law, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 336, 344 (1985).
27
This attitude is best captured in the quip: “It was perhaps appropriate that the age of jazz should
produce a Jazz Jurisprudence.” C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 45 (3d ed. 1939). For more on the
generally unsympathetic attitude to legal realism in England see Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence
Between Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 13, 54–61 (2005). To his credit, Allen removed this description
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real possibility for a meaningful interaction with antediluvian English lawyers,28 while
many English lawyers thought of the developments wrought by legal realism as
antithetical to the very idea of law,29 and were therefore uninterested in borrowing
from American law.
As we shall see, there is some truth to this familiar story, but it is unsatisfactory for
two reasons. First, by itself it does not go deep enough, for it immediately raises the
question, “Why were English lawyers so hostile to realist ideas?” Despite some
interest in realist ideas in certain quarters,30 legal realism took a long time to make
headway in England (some would say, it has yet to do that). Why is that? I will not
attempt to answer this question here, but the argument I will proffer in this essay, if
successful, goes some way toward answering it. Second, I hope to show that even as it
stands the explanation is insufficiently nuanced. In the typical story legal realism is
contrasted with legal formalism, and accordingly American law is treated as realistic
while English law is portrayed as formalistic.31 One aim of this essay is to explain why
this distinction is too crude to be of explanatory value. I will argue that it tends to
conflate different views that are best kept separate.32
To do that, my argument seeks to identify deeper, and older, differences between
English and American common law, which in turn will both help to explain the
different fates of legal realism in the two countries and also their present divergence.
I will argue that the parting of ways reflects a difference in the prevailing political

from later editions of the book, and has in fact quite revised his judgment: “Realists…approach all
settled and traditional doctrines of the law in a spirit of scepticism. Provided that it does not run to mere
showy eccentricity posing as ‘originality’, or degenerate into dissent merely for bravado…scepticism is no
unhealthy frame of mind for the jurist….” C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 44 (7th ed. 1964)
[hereinafter ALLEN, LAW]. He further added that “[g]rown out of its youthful exuberances and disabused
of its hasty conclusion that law is to be found only in facts and deeds, [the realist] movement brings to
modern jurisprudence a spirit of vigilance and exploration which is capable in the right hands of
contributing substantially to the understand of law not as a bloodless abstraction but as a living force in
society.” Id. at 48.
28
See RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
COMMUNITY, 1870–1930, at 280–83 (1987).
29
See, e.g., Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1,
98 (1996).
30
See Cyril Glasser, Radicals and Refugees: The Foundation of the Modern Law Review and English Legal
Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 688, 696–704 (1987); see also Duxbury, supra note 27, at 62–69.
31
See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 410; Stevens, supra note 26, at 343–44.
32
In this I sharply disagree with a position recently presented in BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE
FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010). While Tamanaha too criticizes
the distinction between realism and formalism, he seeks to replace it with a single, middle-of-the-road
“balanced realism.” See id. at 6–7, 181–99. My view, by contrast, is that the formalist–realist divide is
faulty because it is insufficiently nuanced.
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ideologies in the two countries. These different ideologies manifest themselves in
two distinct understandings of the authority of the common law, which in turn explain
the respective attitudes in these countries to what I will call “common law
commonality,” i.e. to the idea that the common law reflects some a kind of
supranational law to which all common law jurisdictions are joint contributors.
Here is how my argument proceeds. I begin by distinguishing between four
different conceptions or models of the authority of the common law. I will argue that
these different conceptions reflect different underlying philosophies for what makes
common law rules binding. Though these different conceptions may seem abstract
and “academic,” I argue that they imply different answers to the question of common
law commonality. I then return to English and American law and argue that the
decline in their commonality is explained by the fact that their underlying accounts of
commonality are different as a result of the two countries’ different political
traditions.
Before proceeding, let me add one important caveat. I believe that the account
offered here provides an important ingredient to understanding that elusive entity
known as “the common law,” as well as the puzzle of the divergence between English
and American law. I do not claim that it provides a complete explanation. Any
complex social phenomenon or change is the product of numerous factors working
together. There are other possible explanations for these phenomena, and it is wellnigh impossible to identify their relative contribution.33 My claim, then, is not that the
argument presented here exclusively explains Anglo-American divergences; only that
it is one important piece in the puzzle.

II. Four Philosophies of the Authority of the Common Law
When talking about the common law some writers become misty-eyed, referring to it
as if it were some mythical entity with a life of its own.34 But to a large extent the
33

See note 139 infra, where I consider the possible relationship between my account and alternative
explanations.
34
See, e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (1912) (“We are here to do
homage to our lady the Common Law….Her soul is founded in an order older than the gods themselves,
but the joy of strife is not strange to her, nor yet the humours of the crowd. She belongs to the kindred of
Homer’s gods, more powerful than men but not passionless or infallible.”); Roscoe Pound, What Is the
Common Law?, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 176, 178–79 (1937) (“The materials of an Anglo-American law library
are increasingly heterogeneous….Yet, when we examine these phenomena more closely, we do seem to
see something universal, permanent, enduring, behind them; something binding our administration of
justice to that of England and Ireland and Canada and Australia; something binding our administration of
justice not merely to that of Blackstone’s time not merely to the classical common-law era, the time of Sir
Edward Coke, but even to the medieval English law….This something we call the common law.”).
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common law is nothing but a record of the reasons provided by a bunch of people—
most of whom left no discernable mark on the history of thought—in the course of
deciding disputes. To the extent that the common law is used as a source of legal
norms, we should try to evaluate how well it performs this function. More concretely,
in justifying it we should be concerned with two related questions: First, is (and,
when is) the common law method a good way for generating legal norms? And
second, what is the basis for the authority of judges deciding cases and (thereby)
generating legal norms? These questions are clearly connected, for an affirmative
answer to the first question will probably go some way toward furnishing an answer to
the second. Nevertheless, they are distinct: One may think common law norms can be
authoritative even if judges are not exceptionally good norm creators, or vice versa.
Furthermore, the question of judges’ authority arises even if one thinks judges should
not (normally) create legal norms. Judges have authority in deciding disputes
between individuals, even if in doing so they are merely following rules, and that
power too requires justification.
In what follows I address directly only the second of the two questions. I do so by
presenting four competing accounts of the authority law and their applicability to the
common law. In each case I present an ideal-type, a philosophical construct in
something close to its pure form. The reality of the common law, the product of the
efforts of many, is never similar to the ideal-types I present here. Within one
jurisdiction one can find different commentators (be they judges, lawyers, or legal
scholars) who express different views on the authority of the common law. And as we
shall, different ideal-types can sometimes be combined to create hybrid accounts.
Nevertheless, the seemingly abstract theoretical discussion of these ideal-types is
valuable because different understandings of the authority of the common law often
lead to different practices, including the question that lies at the heart of this essay,
that of common law commonality. And though the ideal-types are not found
anywhere, different legal systems will tend to manifest certain conceptions more than
others. Thus, if we imagine the four ideal-types as four points forming a square
representing the possible theoretical landscape, different legal systems could be
placed in different positions within that square according to how much they reflect a
commitment to a particular conception. As I will try to show these differences will not
typically be random. Whenever differences in the ideal-type imply differences in the
practice, the latter will tend to reflect a particular ideal-type.
Though such statements are perhaps less common these days, they are far from gone. See, e.g., ANDREW
BURROWS, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON CONTRACT, TORT AND
RESTITUTION 136 (1998) (“I have too much faith in the judiciary, and too much love of the deductive
technique of common law development to wish to see the law frozen by widespread legislative
intervention”); cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 40 (2010) (“The common law
is…governed by a set of attitudes: attitudes of humility and cautious empiricism”).
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When applied to the question of common law commonality, the four ideal-types
lead to different answers to this question ranging from universal (i.e., not just
common law) commonality to a complete rejection of commonality. Armed with this
analytical framework, I will return in the next section to the question with which this
essay began, namely the different attitudes in English and American law to the idea
of common law divergence.

(a) Reason
Reason as an ideal-type may be likened to one familiar conception of natural law.
Though the term “natural law” has been used to describe numerous quite different
ideas (at least one other sense will be discussed below), here I refer to a fairly specific
sense of the term, which seeks to explain the question of the authority of the
common law as an instance of the idea of the inherent authority of practical reason. In
this understanding, law is the product of, and discoverable by, a priori reflection on
about humans, their nature and capacities, and the kind of “juridical relationship”
they find themselves in.
This view has several characteristics: First, the view is very top-down in the sense
that its proponents tend to think that one can derive, more-or-less deductively,
answers to specific questions from a small number of general, a priori principles that
govern whole areas of law (for example, the whole of tort law, perhaps even the whole
of private law). Second, proponents of this view tend to insist on a strict separation
between law and politics and on a parallel distinction between private and public law.
Law “proper” is private law, and it is completely separate from politics, because it is
the product of reason. Public law is the product of political machinations, and as such
can hardly be said to be derived from reason (and, some would say, can hardly be
called “law”). That is why proponents of this view are adamant that “policy” is the
antithesis of pure reason and as such inappropriate for private law. Third, as reason is
unchanging, the norms of private law are (largely) constant, regardless of time and
place; for those who hold this view, the norms in question are not a particular political
community’s attempt to “arrange and rearrange the legal landscape in response to
pressures operative within the organism of social life.”35
The common law has an ambivalent role in the works of proponents of this view.
On the one hand, the historical association of the common law with contract, tort, and
property lends itself to the reproducing the law/politics divide to correspond with the
distinction between common law and statute law. (Proponents of this view tend to
silently pass over the fact that other areas of law such criminal law and family law also
have their origins in judge-made common law.) The distinction between common law
35
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 14 (new ed. 2012); see also ALLAN BEEVER,
FORGOTTEN JUSTICE: THE FORMS OF JUSTICE IN THE HISTORY OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 204–
05 (2013).
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and statute is transformed into the different distinction between private law (the
product of pure reason) and public law (which, despite its legal form, is the product of
political processes).
At the same time, however, one of the striking aspects of this view is its utter
disregard to the common law as a theory of authority. The common law is a useful
category as it carves the domain of private law. But beyond this, the common law as a
distinct form of authority, as a particular way of finding the right answers to legal
questions, is completely discounted: “When asked a difficult question, the common
lawyer, if she is a modern, thinks either of cases or statutes and, if she is a
traditionalist, ponders principles and ideas.”36 What the author of this statement calls
“traditionalism” is the rationalist view under consideration. It is marked by little
regard to court decisions, typically picking a small number of paradigm cases that they
use to illustrate ideas their validity they derive from elsewhere. To most
contemporary proponents of this view, the main source of inspiration is the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, not the history of the common law.
Though this view has some following in academic circles, it has had relatively
little influence on the development of the common law.37 Early in the nineteenth
century it had some influence among American writers,38 but it was largely by writers
influenced by civil law and who have urged common lawyers to adopt its methods.39
These days this approach owes its relative success in the legal academy to the

36
Id. at 206. To see the similarity between this view and civilian thinking, compare R.W. Lee, The
Law of Blasphemy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 149, 156 (1918) (“In civil law jurisdictions the decision of the courts
are said to be determined by the authority of reason rather than by reason of authority”).
37
Natural law thinking is not absent from the common law. Nevertheless, it is notable that often
references to natural law by common law writers were often nothing more than “veneer.” D.J. Ibbetson,
Natural Law and Common Law, 5 EDINBURGH L. REV. 4, 12 (2001). Even when given a more constructive
role in providing doctrinal ideas or structure for various areas of law, it is rare to find the law-as-reason
conception of natural law in the history of the common law. Blackstone, for example, has always
combined ideas derived from natural law thinking with a custom-based theory of authority. See MICHAEL
LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760–1850, at 19, 31, 36–37 (1991); DAVID
LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY BRITAIN 37–45 (1990). His references to natural law were consistent with scholarly assumption
at the time, but were not used to derived specific conclusions in a manner similar to a reason-based
account of the law. See id. at 46.
38
See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 672–73 (1981). Even then these ideas were often mixed with others.
See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 580–81 (2006).
39
See M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Landgell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95,
112–15 (1986). It is often thought that Langdell represented this view as well, but I think the place he
gave to cases in the derivation of law’s principles suggests a different approach. See note 150 infra, and
accompanying text.

12

influence of professional moral philosophy in law schools, rather than to anything
found in legal practice itself. In the English-speaking world its most prominent
proponent is Ernest Weinrib. In his writings Weinrib drew an explicit link between
his view and a particular conception of natural law when he said that “[i]nasmuch as
[legal forms] are immanent to the juridical relationship they inform, they shed light
on the traditional claim of natural law theory that law is an ordering of reason.”40
Despite its defenders’ claims to being committed to explaining the law “from
within,”41 the reality is that it thrives on the gap between academic law and legal
practice. Nevertheless, in part for completeness’s sake, in part because of the
presence of this view in contemporary literature, it is worth exploring briefly its
attitude towards commonality. As just mentioned, proponents of this view do not
much care for the common law and its history, drawing their ideas from Kant and
other non-consequentialist moral philosophers. That Kant had virtually no influence
on the development of the common law is, for them, entirely irrelevant. What matters
is what pure practical reason requires and that is not something about which
geography or history have much to say.
It follows from this perspective that the common law is not just ignored as
exemplifying a theory of authority, but also as an important jurisdictional divide.
Indeed, the centrality of reason as a foundation of law can itself be seen as a
borrowing from civilian legal systems, where the idea has played a much more
prominent role.42 The kind of natural law that these scholars see as providing the
basis for the authority of the common law exists is universal. The way one ought to
behave according to reason is equally available to all humans who have the capacity to
reason, i.e. to all humans, wherever and whenever they are. No doubt what one ought
to do in particular circumstances may be affected by those circumstances, but reason
itself remains unchanging, and so are the general rules it prescribes.43 On this view

40

Ernest J. Weinrib, Why Legal Formalism, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 341,
341 (Robert P. George ed., 1992); see also Allan Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 421, 428–29 (2013).
41
See WEINRIB, supra note 35, at 18 (arguing that private law is “immanently intelligible”); ALLAN
BEEVER, REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 34–36 (2007) (defending an “internal” analysis of
law). For a critique of the supposed internality of this approach see Dan Priel, Land Use Priorities and the
Law of Nuisance, 39 MELB. U. L. REV. 346, 360–65 (2015).
42
See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW
151–55 (4th ed. 2008); FRANZ WIACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 257–75 (Tony Weir
trans., 1995) (2d ed. 1967). It is notable that reference to custom was forbidden in some law-as-reason
natural law codes. See id. at 268.
43
See Allan Beever, How to Have a Common Private Law: The Presuppositions of Legal Conversation, in
THE COMMON LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: DIVERGENCE AND UNITY 215, 227–28 (Andrew Robertson &
Michael Tilbury eds., 2016) [hereinafter DIVERGENCE AND UNITY] (arguing that all common law
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the authority of the common law does not derive from anything in the common law
itself, but from whether it matches the pre-existing norms of natural law discovered
with the aid of reason. Whether a given legal system succeeds in matching this natural
law is a contingent fact.
Despite some academic following, such ideas, especially in anything resembling
their pure form, are rare in contemporary common law practice.44 With the central
place it accords to history, the common law is not a hospitable ground for such an
approach. A variant on this view may be thought to have had greater success. This
view seeks to merge civilian thinking with respect to the common law tradition with
its focus on cases. The prominent English academic Peter Birks is probably the best
exponent of this approach. Though Birks was not particularly interested in the work
of Kant or that of his present-day followers, his works convey a clear affinity, one that
intensified over the years, with Roman law and its contemporary civilian
descendants.45 Given the common law’s attachment to history as a source of authority,
Birks’s strategy of unearthing the Roman law influences on the development of the
common law may be seen as an attempt to incorporating civilian thinking into the
common law on the basis of acceptable common law methods.
The effect was that like his more philosophical counterparts, Birks was largely
indifferent to the common law/civil law divide, borrowing freely (some would say
exorbitantly) from civilian legal systems and scholars, both in terms of modes of
thought and in terms of substantive ideas. Furthermore, his thinking reflected the
rationalist approach in the way he sought to defend the basis of legal liability. Perhaps
the most striking example of this attitude is his defense of the fundamental principle
of unjust enrichment. The existence of this principle was not for Birks a matter to be
derived from the cases. It was a part of reality, one that anyone who will put his mind
to the matter will recognize. A legal system that did not have a law of unjust
enrichment acknowledged as an independent legal category was deficient, even if it
reached the right outcomes: “It displaces the truth. And it introduces a lie.”46 It is

jurisdictions aim at “an objective truth” and they all “aim at the same thing,” which is why divergence
does not imply differences in local circumstances, but that at least one jurisdiction “must be wrong”).
44
This is not merely my assessment. This is admitted by proponents of this view. See, e.g., BEEVER,
supra note 36, at 243 (lamenting the fact that the prevailing views on law pose “an enormous obstacle
standing in the way of our understanding of our law”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Does Tort Law Have a Future?,
34 VAL. U. L. REV. 561 (2000) (criticizing courts for departing from his preferred views).
45
On Birks’s devotion to Roman law see Gerald McMell, What Kind of Jurist Was Peter Birks?, 19
RESTITUTION L. REV. 15, 20–21, 22–23 (2011); Lionel Smith, Peter Birks and Comparative Law, 43 REVUE
DE DROIT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 193, 198–203 (2013), although Smith attributes to Birks
the claim that “each tradition must develop according to its own genius,” id. at 198, which I think is not
an accurate description of Birks’s view.
46
PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 22 (rev. ed. 1989).
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clear from such statements that for Birks, legal truth was independent of what one
found in the cases. But if one were to wonder what constituted that legal truth, Birks
had surprisingly little to say on the matter. Ultimately, the justification of first
principles derived from its indubitable rational appeal.47
As Birks is widely considered to have been one of the most influential English
legal academics of the last century, his commitment to this view of the common law
might be used to counter my claim that the reason-based conception of the authority
of the common law has little support. Though Birks’s influence is undeniable, in his
efforts to convert other common lawyers to civilian ways of thinking,48 have met with
little success.49

(b) Practice
In terms of its impact on common law thinking, what I will call the “practice
conception of authority,” has been far more significant. Unlike the previous view that
sees the basis of law’s authority in “natural reason,” this view sees the common law’s
authority as somehow derived from the law’s “artificial reason.” The law’s reason is
not something available “naturally” to all individuals; rather it requires special
expertise and erudition in legal materials, as it is the product of working out of the
law from a mass of legal materials. These materials are not strictly speaking the law,
but it is through careful consideration and interpretation of these materials that one
derives the law from them.

47
See PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 6–8 (2d ed. 2005) (the justification of the basic principle
of unjust enrichment is its self-evidence, regardless of what courts say). Contrast this with ANDREW
BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 4 (3d ed. 2011) (the ultimate justification of the law of restitution
is to be found in the cases).
48
See Peter B.H. Birks, More Logic and Less Experience: The Difference Between Scots Law and English
Law, in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS 167 (David L.
Carey Mill & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1997) [hereinafter Birks, More Logic]; Peter Birks, This Heap of
Good Learning: The Jurist in the Common Law Tradition, in LAW MAKING, LAW FINDING, AND LAW SHAPING
113 (Basil Markesinis ed., 1997) [hereinafter LAW MAKING].
49
Birks was the subject of a thinly-veiled attack in the Australian High Court’s decision in
Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd., [2001] HCA 68, 208 C.L.R. 516, at [70]–[89]. Justice
Gummow captured in it the difference between Birks’s reason approach and the practice-based approach
I discuss below: “To the lawyer whose mind has been moulded by civilian influences, the theory may
come first, and the source of the theory may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges.
However, that is not the way in which a system based on case law develops; over time, general principle
is derived from judicial decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around.” Roxborough, supra,
at [72]. Burrows expressed puzzlement at this criticism in Andrew Burrows, The Australian Law of
Restitution: Has the High Court Lost Its Way?, in EXPLORING PRIVATE LAW 67, 73–74 (Elise Bant &
Matthew Harding eds., 2010). But the critique is accurate. Burrows’s puzzlement reflects the fact that his
own writings are founded on the practice-based approach.
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In some respects this is still a dominant, perhaps the dominant, view among
common lawyers in the Commonwealth. It is often depicted with the image of the
“blackletter lawyer,” who knows all the cases, and believes that answers to new legal
questions can and should be derived from analyzing them. Here, the law’s authority is
the product of “long study and experience”50 of legal materials acquired by a small
cadre of legal experts, not the natural reason that is available to any person who puts
her mind to the matter. A defender of the practice view does not see herself as having
to look for a justification of the decisions any source external to the legal decisions; it
is the law that furnishes its own justification. This approach is often seen by its critics
(and, admittedly, by some of its supporters) as an example of the (English) lawyer’s
anti-intellectualism. (“Jurisprudence,” Dicey once wrote, “is a word that stinks in the
nostrils of the practising barrister.”51) But professing a lack of interest in philosophy
does not mean not having one. As Keynes once famously remarked, “Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”52
Or a defunct philosopher. Anthony Quinton identified what he thought were the
three central principles of conservatism: First, “traditionalism,” namely “attachment
to, or reverence for, established customs and institutions,” and “hostility to sudden,
precipitate…change.” Second, “organicism, which takes a society to be a unitary,
natural growth, an organized, living whole, not a mechanical aggregate.” And third,
“political scepticism, the belief that political wisdom, the kind of knowledge that is
needed for the successful management of human affairs, is not to be found in the
theoretical speculations of isolated thinkers but in the historically accumulated social
experience of the community as a whole.”53 It does not take much to see the
similarity between this and the practice conception of the common law. (If any
change is needed it is in transferring the ideas about the organicism of society to the
“seamless web” of the common law.) Edmund Burke, with whom this conception of
conservatism is most frequently associated, has himself drawn a link between his
political ideas and the common law method as explicated by the likes of Edward

50

Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B.). Coke famously
contrasted natural and artificial reason and argued that legal cases are governed by the latter. See id.
There is a clear gap between this view and the natural reason view, which considers reason available to
all humans.
51
A.V. Dicey, The Study of Jurisprudence, 5 LAW MAG. & REV. (4th ser.) 382, 382 (1880).
52
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 383
(1936).
53
ANTHONY QUINTON, THE POLITICS OF IMPERFECTION: THE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
TRADITIONS OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM HOOKER TO OAKESHOTT 16–17 (1978).
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Coke and Matthew Hale.54 Operating on the basis of limited information in the
course of resolving particular cases, this approach seeks to work out a “philosophy,”
albeit always a provisional one, that emerges from narrow “common sense” responses
to concrete incidents rather than as a derivation from a grand overarching
philosophy.55
Notice that the relevant community for such practices is not the general public.
The custom in question refers to an accepted view among the community of lawyers.
It is “judicial opinions” which are “the principal and most authoritative evidence, that
can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common
law,” said Blackstone.56 This approach thus has another “Burkean” characteristic: The
common law is an anti-democratic, perhaps even aristocratic affair.
The obverse of this view is the view that appeals to abstract discussions in moral
philosophy, social history, economics, or any other discipline outside the law as
justification for legal rules are misguided. A proponent of this view will not deny that
prevailing ideas outside the law have an impact on the development of the law, but to
the extent that they do, those are already incorporated, often unconsciously, into legal
materials. Thus, unlike the natural reason view, the practice view allows some
reliance on “public policy,” though insists that it is nothing more than “a body of rules
in some cases fixed, in other cases flexible, but governed by precedent and authority
like other branches of the common law.”57 Appeals to policy are neither an invitation
for lawyers to frame grand theories about the law, nor a place to introduce alien
disciplines into the law.
This form of “internality” is most significant in the way it seeks to explain not just
the sources of the common law but its authority. On the practice-based view the most
fundamental error of the other approaches to the common law’s authority is that they
seek to justify the law by appeal to other disciplines. Unlike the natural reason view
which claims to be internal to the law but sees law as justified to the extent that it
matches the precepts of pure practical reason (which are external to the law),
defenders of the practice view take seriously the idea that justifying the law involves
the ability to reconstruct a successful argument in support of a legal conclusion from
existing legal materials. A justified legal argument is the most compelling argument

54

See J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution—A Problem in the History of Ideas, 3 HIST. J. 125,
128–31, 137–38 (1960). Pocock in fact finds Burke more open to ideas coming to law from the outside
than the common lawyers, for whom all ideas had to come from “within” the law. See id. at 139.
55
See JOHN LAWS, THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 7–9 (2014); STRAUSS, supra note 34, at 40–42.
56
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *69.
57
Lord Wright, Public Policy, in LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 66, 95 (1939). Additional examples of
this view are found in Michael Lobban, English Jurisprudence and Tort Theory, in THE IMPACT OF IDEAS ON
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 127, 133–34 (Michael Lobban & Julia Moses eds., 2012).
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one can construct on the basis of existing legal materials. Law on this view does not
have any master but itself.
The idea here is not that previous legal decisions have authority merely because
they took place in the past. Rather, the idea is that traditions have authority, and that
novel decisions ought to be justified as part of a tradition, by showing how they fit
within a pattern of past decisions. To those who accept this view, traditions have
authority, because history is the repository of a great deal of slowly accumulated
knowledge that accumulates to a kind of communal wisdom. That is why the
common law can have authority even though it is just, to use the phrase I used earlier,
“a record of the reasons provided by a bunch of people—most of whom left no
discernable mark on the history of thought—in the course of deciding disputes”: it
reflects the combined efforts of the ages, and as such is wiser than each individual on
his or her own.
The authority of the past is thus tied to a certain implicit epistemological theory.
But it is not simply the view that we should appeal to the wisdom of crowds. Another
central component of this view focuses on the uncertainty inherent with making
changes to any complex system. In the choice between the familiar and the novel, we
should favor the former as it is the devil we know. Large scale changes are bound to
have unexpected and unpredictable consequences, which is why they are almost
always likely to be changes for the worse. On the other hand, the incremental
developments sanctioned by this view appear to be mere commonsensical extensions
of the accepted and familiar (using analogies and other seemingly neutral tools of
thought). The normativity of social institutions is thus inherently a communal,
distributed, effort, the product of the joint efforts of many minds (both living and
dead). This view thus stands in sharp contrast to the reason-based conception, which
asserts that any single individual can, by the application of pure reason, identify
correct moral principles.
Properly understood, then, the claim is not that the content of law is what it used
to be in some ancient point in the past. It sees history as a source of authority, not (or
not in any simple way) as a source of law’s content. One should seek the “true” or
“original” understanding of law in some ancient texts, because they are somehow
purer or the people who wrote them wiser. The idea is rather that what gives law
today its normative force, its authority, is the fact that it has been derived from past
law through a process of working and reworking of solutions from existing materials.
It is therefore no challenge to this view that the law today is different from what it
used to be. On the contrary, this view acknowledges the possibility, even the
inevitability, of legal change. Indeed, the skepticism of universal truths and the
commitment to the normative significance of history that is central to this view imply
that what ought to be done now may be different from what had to be done in the
past. Moreover, unlike the reason-based view, which sees an unbridgeable chasm
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between what people do (which is wholly in the domain of the “is”) and what they
should do (which belongs to the wholly separate domain of “ought”), the practicebased view insists that what the law ought to be is in some sense dependent on what
law is, and what law is is in some sense dependent on what it used to be. That, on the
practice view, is precisely what we see in common law adjudication. The seemingly
anti-theoretical, non-ideological nature of this approach—its explicit rejection of all
grand ideas (except, perhaps, for the grand idea that there are no grand ideas)—and
its tendency to justify ideas by the fact that “we did so in the past,” are all familiar
features of the common law.
It is these ideas that explain the reason and the manner with which this approach
seeks to keep the common law separate from politics: Not in terms of the strict
separation between law and politics that proponents of the natural reason approach
insist upon. Proponents of the practice-based view acknowledge that major drifts in
the zeitgeist have impact on the law; but this view maintains that when lawyers are
seeking justification in past cases, they are engaged in an activity that is relatively free
from transient political changes and as such stands largely outside the domain of
democracy.58 Law on this view is a technocratic affair, the product of almost
bureaucratic expertise, not of deep philosophical reflection.59 It is for this reason that
the legislature should largely stay out of the common law; for legislators lack the
requisite kind of expertise and knowledge in the history of law that should guide its
future development. Even when legislative reforms do happen, the real work should
be left to “expert” practice-based lawyers, not to politicians.60
In a clear statement of this view Andrew Burrows has called for “law to be treated
essentially as an autonomous discipline.”61 In this autonomous conception legal
scholars (working in close proximity with members of the elite guild known as “the
bar”),62 work by “analys[ing] carefully the latest reported decisions” and improve the
law by “ensur[ing] consistency and rationality in decision-making.”63 Burrows does
not think the common law should be used for “the introduction of new social
policies”;64 rather it should be used for the development of existing rules (i.e.,
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See BURROWS, supra note 34, at 122; ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 318–19, 324, 332
(2007).
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See, e.g., id. at 307 (“The law of torts is much more boring than is commonly supposed”); id. at 329
(explicitly rejecting appeal to the philosophy of Kant and Hegel for understanding or justifying tort law).
60
See id. at 319; BURROWS, supra note 34, at 136.
61
Id. at 113.
62
See id. at 112.
63
Id.
64
Id. The right tools for solving “difficult practical problems” are, accordingly, “precision in analysis
and language.” Id. Though Burrows declares himself fascinated with theoretical inquiries, he seems to
think of “deep theory,” id. at 114, as a kind of academic parlor game. It may be an amusing pastime, but
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existing social policies). In this respect, Burrows does not deny that political values
enter into the law, claiming even that the law should be based on “shared political
and moral values in society.”65 And yet, echoing the Burkean, anti-democratic vision
of the common law, Burrows makes clear that “contract, tort and restitution rest on
fundamental long-term values that, while evolving and adapting to new conditions
over the course of time, and while influenced by long-term policies, should be
immune from short-term party politics.”66 Burrows’s preference for an autonomous
discipline of law guarantees that the source of information about those political and
moral values would only be their expression in the legal materials that he thinks are
the main (perhaps only) sources that the legal scholar should engage in.
Despite the centrality of this conception of the common law’s authority, this view
is (with one very important, partial, exception) alien to the dominant discourse in
contemporary jurisprudence, because contemporary jurisprudence does not take the
common law seriously.67 It treats the common law as a series of rules that happen to
have been generated by courts, but could just as well have been produced by a
legislature. In contemporary jurisprudence which reduces law to a set of rules, this
difference in the mode of promulgation is seen as having little normative significance.
The only thing that matters for philosophical analysis of law is the content of the
rules. Consequently, in the apparent divide between “legal positivism” and “natural
law” both views take the justification of law to be the product of its congruence with
pre-existing moral standards. To put this point slightly differently, though most legal
philosophers embrace the idea that understanding the practice of law should requires
adopting the “internal point of view” of legal practitioners, the very same scholars
(implicitly) reject the idea that the justification of law should be internal to law. The
prevailing jurisprudential view is that internal justification is part of what lawyers do,
that this is how one plays the legal game; yet, the dominant view is that law is
it has no practical relevance. See id. at 119 (warning of the “danger of the next generation of restitutionscholars crossing the line from practical to impractical scholarship”).
65
Id. at 112.
66
Id.; see also id. at 110–11 (nineteenth century common law was influenced by laissez-faire).
67
Ronald Dworkin is the exception, someone who sees understanding and justification of law as
continuous activities and therefore insists that both should be internal to the practice. Because of his
divergence on this fundamental point from almost all other legal theorists, there has been a tendency to
read him along familiar lines (i.e., as arguing for internal understanding but external justification). This
error has led to many misunderstandings of his views. See Dan Priel, Making Some Sense of Nonsense
Jurisprudence (unpublished manuscript). Though Dworkin is in some respects the most prominent
contemporary defender of this conception of authority, he developed it in such a way (combining it with
elements of the custom-based view to be discussed below) that blurred the distinction between law and
morality and gave a fairly small role to legal doctrine. This is why doctrinal lawyers committed to the
practice-based view, while recognizing him occasionally as something of an ally, have remained
ambivalent to his ideas.
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ultimately subject to a higher tribunal (of interpersonal morality, justice, welfare, and
so on). This is why they will look at doctrinal lawyers who are uninterested in
questions of “justification” with puzzlement and even some disdain. The blackletter
lawyer’s lack of interest in anything outside the cases strikes them as a sign of
intellectual laziness (if not worse), for the idea that law can provide its own
justification seems, from the externalist perspective on justification that is dominant
in contemporary jurisprudence, almost impossible to understand. The mere fact that
certain people behave in a certain way, thinking that their actions are authoritative,
does not seem to be sufficient, even prima facie, for establishing the authority of the
common law. But this attitude reflects the disconnect between contemporary legal
philosophy and much common law thinking: Within the practice conception of
authority, there is no higher tribunal for the justification of law.68 Some form of
insularity, therefore, is a prerequisite of the job.
By contrast to the relative insularity of lawyers from nonlawyers, this approach
tends to look favorably at cross-jurisdictional conversations among lawyers, or more
precisely to some such conversations. Because the practice view gives considerable
significance to path dependence and historical development, it will tend to be
sympathetic to commonality among legal systems if they have a shared historical
origin. Since authority on this view has its basis in history, the law of another
jurisdiction can be significant (and compelling even if not binding) as long as the two
legal systems have a shared history and can see themselves as belonging to the same
“tradition.” And here, obviously, the relevant tradition invoked is the “common law
tradition.” That is why proponents of this view insist on commonality among common
law jurisdictions, while looking askance at suggestions that common law jurisdictions
should convergence with legal systems that belong to a different “tradition.”69 I will
return to this point below when I address the question of commonality among
common law jurisdictions.
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(c) Custom
The common law is often described as custom from time immemorial. This is the
historical sense of the common law just discussed under the heading of practice or
artificial reason. In referring here to the common law as custom I have a different,
although related, idea in mind: the common law as contemporaneous custom.70 On this
view the common law is justified because, and to the extent that, it reflects prevailing
norms of the community. If the law succeeds in reflecting prevailing custom, many
problems with explaining its authority become less intractable. When law reflects
prevailing custom, it reflects standards of behavior already accepted. This provides a
solution to the common law’s lack of adequate notice and publicity, as well as its
alleged retroactivity. In this way this approach, with a dose of fiction, can explain the
authority of law in terms of consent; not past consent (social contract), but as present,
implied consent.
This way of understanding the common law is particularly appealing within a
republican form of government. Central to republican thought is the idea of selfgovernment, i.e. that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people. One way of
understanding this idea is that the solution to the problem of the justification of
authority lies in creating a form of government in which the laws are not really
imposed on their “subjects,” but are rather created by the people themselves. When
this is the case, these self-imposed laws cannot be seen as a limitation on the people’s
freedom, even if they remove some of the options available to them.71 This view sees
the majoritarian devices we associate with “democracy” as a means or a technique,
serving the end of republican self-government. To the extent that there are other (and
in some contexts superior) techniques of attaining that end the fact that they are not
adopted by a majoritarian representative body need not count against them. Judgemade law, even when created by unelected judges, is less problematic if the law
created reflects accepted norms. Thus, if the practice-based approach to the common
law can be seen as elitist, historicist, and closed, the custom-based approach is, in its
ideal form, populist, presentist, and open. In this version of the common law its
justification lies in its “social congruence,” the idea “that disputes will be resolved
under, and law will be based upon, the society’s prevailing standards.”72
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Karl Llewellyn provides an almost textbook statement of this view. In his
account, both common law and statute must ultimately be immanent in the folkways
of the people. “Savigny,” he said, “may not have phrased a bull’s-eye with his idea of
the necessary conditioning of all law by the people’s right-way-of-life, but right law
which touches people must live in them. If law does not so live, it goes first technical;
it goes then formal and remote. Remote law is not law to love, but law to dodge, or to
use.”73 Llewellyn brought home this democratic conception of law when he said that
“the common law [is] at its high best” when it “ceases to be remote, when law comes
home, [and] then a process works out among the citizenry of a democracy which is the
exact analogue of the common law judicial sequence of self-correction, of judicial
review of prior judicial decision—which is, indeed, its twin and needed brother.”74
Llewellyn sometimes described this conception of the common law in terms of
“natural law which is real, not imaginary,” but as he made clear, this conception of
natural law was “not a creature of mere reason,” but rather depends to a great extent
on “the life conditions of the time and place.”75 As such, this natural law was “not
eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very
circumstances of life.”76 This view gave particular place to the common law—and to
the lawyer within the common law—as a conduit of values and attitudes of a
particular people. It is a view of natural law in which “[g]uidance for a particular
society must plant its feet in that society.”77 Thus, in stark contrast to the elitist
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practice-based view, which seeks to insulate the common law from popular influence,
this view insists that the common law must be in constant contact with it.
Still, it might seem odd to suggest that the common law reflects contemporary
custom, because it seems so much more complex when compared to vague customary
standards.78 But if understood as an account of the authority of the law (rather than of
its content), then the concern can be, at least partly, assuaged. The practice view is
not (or need not) assume that every decision of the common law reflects existing
custom. Rather, the common law should aim to reflect prevailing social norms at a
fairly high level of abstraction; specific decisions could still be seen to fit prevailing
attitudes so long as they would be accepted by most people (if they put their minds
to them). In practice, this implies that a custom-based version of the common law will
acquire certain practice-based characteristics, but even then there remain differences
between the two. As mentioned, practice is elitist and closed, seeing law as a lawyers’
affair, while custom is populist and open. In more practical terms, for the custombased approach not to collapse to the practice-based approach, for it not to become a
lawyer’s affair that pays lip service to “the people,” it must adopt certain institutional
mechanisms that will enshrine its populism. To anticipate the argument below, this is
exactly what we see in the American legal system, the legal system most closely
committed to this conception of the common law’s authority.
Because of the strong connection this view sees between the authority of the
common law and the people of a particular political unit and the idea of selfgovernment, this view will tend not be particularly keen on commonality, regardless
of whether that other jurisdiction is classified as a common law jurisdiction.79 It may
allow for some commonality between communities that share certain values, but it
will not insist on the significance of maintaining it. Even when we find such
commonality, it will more likely be the product of different jurisdictions reaching
similar outcomes relatively independently (because they happen to share some
values), rather than as a result of a conscious effort to maintain commonality. Even
when one finds such commonality, within this view there is not going to be much
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purchase to the view that commonality is valuable in itself and should be sought after
as a goal.

(d) Will
The will-based conception is the view that sees the authority of all law, whether
legislative or judge-made, as derived from an act of will of a person or body who is
designated sovereign. In the English-speaking world this view received its most
forceful articulation in the writings of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes explicated this view
in Leviathan and later, at greater length in his posthumously published Dialogue
Between a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common Laws of England. Put together, these
works can be seen as an unstinting attack on the three other suggested foundations
for the common law and a defense of the view that it is the sovereign’s will that
provides the only basis for the authority of law, all law. As Hobbes put it, “our King is
to us the Legislator both of Statute-Law and of Common-Law.”80
Hobbes definitely did not dismiss the idea of natural reason and its ability to
discover certain rational truths. He agreed with Coke that “Reason is the Soul of the
Law.”81 He even called these truths natural laws and in his writings he went into
quite some detail in explicating them. But as he made clear, these natural laws were
not real law, simply rational precepts conducive to survival and peace.82 Hobbes was
also emphatic that natural reason could not be the basis for legal authority, or as he put
it, “it is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law.”83 That is because there are
endless disagreements about what reason requires, and so basing law’s authority on
moral correctness is bound to lead to chaos: “Would you have every Man to every
other Man alledge for Law his own particular Reason? There is no amongst Men an
Universal Reason agreed upon in any Nation, besides the Reason of him that hath the
Soveraign Power.”84 Though natural reason was available to all, it was, in fact, highly
contested, and therefore it was a mistake to call it law: “it is by the Soveraigne Power
that [natural law] is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes of
Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes published [by diverse
authors], and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.”85
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And because the law of nature is law in virtue of the sovereign’s will, what is law is
the sovereign’s interpretation of natural law, as determined by those to whom the
sovereign delegates this power, namely judges.86
Unlike the sovereign’s interpretations of natural law, judicial opinions do not
create law: “Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another; I mean divers Men, in
divers Ages, upon the same case give divers Judgments. Therefore I will ask your
Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King, as to their
validity in Law.”87 The rejection of the practice-based account to the authority of the
common law here is most uncompromising. The judge’s opinion has authority only to
the extent that it reflects the sovereign’s view. “In all Courts of Justice, the
Soveraign…is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the
reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be
according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own,
and an unjust one.”88
Hobbes, however, did not leave it at that. He also stated that the idea of artificial
reason available only to those who acquired learning in the law simply made no sense:
“that the Reason which is the Life of the Law, should be not Natural, but Artificial I

and passion” anyone could discover the content of the laws of nature. But, alas, “there be very few,
perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passions,” which is why the
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cannot conceive.”89 Hobbes more than hinted that Coke advanced this view in order
to strengthen lawyers’ power,90 and he dedicated considerable space to dismantling it.
This is unsurprising, as this was perhaps the most prominent basis for the argument
that the authority of the common law is distinct from the authority of the sovereign, a
view that was at odds with the most basic tenets of Hobbes’s political philosophy.
Hobbes was also critical of the idea of custom as the basis of authority. He did not
discuss the particular version of custom-based authority considered here, present-day
custom,91 but his view on ancient custom is nevertheless revealing. Custom on its own
is completely lacking in normative force: “When long Use obtaineth the authority of a
Law, it is not the Length of Time that maketh Authority, but the Will of the
Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;)
and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein.”92 He quotes the
view advanced by some lawyers that “no Customes [can be] Law, but such as are
reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished,” but immediately qualifies it
with his own gloss: “But the Judgment of what is reasonable, and of what is to be
abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly,
or Monarch.”93
Hobbes’s view sees law as a tool of political authorities, and as such eradicates the
distinction, so central to the other approaches, between law and politics. Law on this
view is simply the means by which political authorities act. This approach can still
maintain the importance of keeping adjudication free from political influence, which
explains why Hobbes was consistent when he insisted on the importance of judicial
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impartiality;94 but this in no way affects the fundamental idea that all law, common
law as well as statutory law, is inherently political.95
Because law is the means by which political authorities announce their
“commands” for the sake of promoting the ends of that political community, there is
no basis for seeing the law of any other nation as tied in some special connection to
the law of any other. The common law is not some supranational legal system that
exists as a brooding omnipresence in the sky. It is the law of a particular political unit,
and it differs from other forms of law (statutes, executive directives) only by its means
of promulgation. This Hobbesian view, which received its clear articulation in
Holmes’s dissent quoted above, is thus (at best) indifferent to the law of other
nations, and often openly hostile to suggestions of common law commonality.

(e) Beyond Ideal-Types
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the four ideal-types presented so far.
Table 1: Four common law ideal-types

Approach

Basis of authority

Relationship between
law and politics

Attitude to
commonality

Reason (“natural”
reason)

Reason

Strictly separate

Commonality is
ideally universal

Practice
(“artificial” reason)

The normative
force of tradition

Largely separate, but
weak influence of
politics on law

Limited to legal
systems that belong
to the same
“tradition”

Custom

Contemporary
acceptance

No strict separation:
Influence of politics
on custom and
through that on law

Only on the basis of
a (contingent) fact of
extra-legal similarity
in practices and
customs

Will

Political sovereignty

Law is politics

Unsympathetic
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In the real world philosophical ideas are rarely instantiated in pure form, which is why
I described the four conceptions as ideal-types. It would be tedious to spell out in
great detail all possible connections between the different ideal-types. I will,
however, mention briefly a few such links which seem to me more relevant to
understanding some of the arguments I develop below.
One often finds, sometimes within one work, the reason-based and practice-based
approaches (i.e., natural and artificial reason) discussed together,96 perhaps because
both are associated with some notion of reason. Thus, defenders of the idea that
unjust enrichment occupies a fundamental area of English law constantly shift
between the view that this is so because English courts have so declared (a practicebased argument), an argument used against those who challenge the view these
authors find in the cases; and the view that unjust enrichment is a basic legal category
regardless of what courts say, which is the view to which the same authors shift when
they are unhappy with what they find in the cases.97 What this example also illustrates
is that the common alliance between these two views is superficial, and often barely
conceals fundamental differences between them.98
Another real-world alliance is between the “republican,” custom-based idea and
the will-based view, if the will is understood to be the will of the people. Since the
will-based view is itself consistent with different views of who the sovereign is, it is
by itself consistent with the republican idea of popular sovereignty. Here too,
however, the two views can come into tension, if, for example, there is a growing
perception that institutions understood to exist in order to make sure that the will of
the people is reflected in the laws, become corrupted.
Alongside attempts to bring together two different conceptions of authority, in
some instances we find hybrid accounts, which divide the domain of law. Such views
explain the authority of the common law in one way and the authority of statute
differently. Thus, it is common for those who think of the common law as grounded in
practice to think of legislation as grounded in will. It is precisely this difference that
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explains why proponents of this view seek to keep common law and statute
separate.99

III. Why Did English–American Commonality Decline?
We now have the theoretical apparatus to explain the decline of English–American
commonality. In brief, my argument is that there are two dominant conceptions of the
common law authority in the United States, the will and the custom views; by contrast,
in England (and the rest of the common law world), the more dominant view in the
last century has been the practice view. The first aim of this section is to substantiate
my respective characterizations of the English and American understandings of the
common law. I then hope to explain in more detail how different underlying
rationales of common law authority play out on the question of commonality.

(a) English Common Law as Artificial Reason
The very same Dicey who extolled the similarities between English and American
common law, also expressed the following view about the relationship between the
common law and prevailing attitudes:
The Courts or the judges, when acting as legislators, are of course influenced by the beliefs
and feelings of their time, and are guided to a considerable extent by the dominant current
of public opinion….But whilst our tribunals, or the judges of whom they are composed, are
swayed by the prevailing beliefs of a particular time, they are also guided by professional
opinions and ways of thinking which are, to a certain extent, independent of and possibly
opposed to the general tone of public opinion. The judges are the heads of the legal
profession. They have acquired the intellectual and moral tone of English lawyers. They are
men advanced in life. They are for the most part persons of a conservative disposition. They
are in no way dependent for their emoluments, dignity, or reputation upon the favour of the electors, or
even the Ministers who represent in the long run the wishes of the electorate. They are more likely to
be biassed [sic] by professional habits and feeling than by the popular sentiment of the
hour.100

This is an example of the practice view, which at least from the late nineteenth
century has been the dominant conception of the common law in England. No doubt
one could find proponents of other views (in fact, some of them have been mentioned
earlier), but as far as I can tell Dicey’s words reflect a dominant view.
Against the dominance of a predominantly Hobbesian (or, if you wish, Diceyan
via John Austin) will-based foundation for the authority of legislation, the dominance
of the practice-based approach to the common law has been an interesting political
99
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success. On this view, the common law is seen as relatively separate from statute, as a
distinct area of law that answers mostly to its own principles, which are largely
unaffected by whatever changes take place in legislation. Though proponents of this
view do not question the supremacy of legislation in all areas of law, they seek to
keep legislation in “common law” areas to a bare minimum.101 While this is a
speculation, it is possible that this view has proven attractive as a means for
maintaining the judiciary as a counterbalance to legislative and executive branches
that otherwise has almost unlimited power within the model of Parliamentary
supremacy. By holding to the idea that the common law derives its authority from a
different source, the courts could maintain a modicum of formal independence and
on occasion the means for checking the other branches of government.102
Be that as it may, there are many less speculative aspects of the English approach
to the common law that make sense when considered against its practice-based
background. Take, for example, the importance attached by English lawyers to the
ability to provide a firm explanation of an outcome from within existing legal
materials, and the outright rejection of reasoning backwards from a desired result to
its legal rationalization. It is not just that the idea that with some facility with legal
materials one could reach any outcome whatsoever is rejected; what is interesting is
the way it is rejected:
Any man who knows how to handle the professional apparatus of reference can find, with
moderate industry, something like a show of authority for almost anything: and it is the
delight of a certain class of advocates to snatch an advantage (though it is apt to be a fleeting
one) by this method. But the law is not made by casual and hasty decisions in courts of first
instance. Its guiding principles and the harmony of its controlling ideas must be sought in
the considered judgments of the higher tribunals which command universal respect; and
whatever is contrary to the general consent of leading authorities ought to be frankly
discarded as erroneous.103

Pollock makes here the “realist” point that it is technically possible to find an
“authority” for any desired outcome. This, however, does not undermine the
authority of the common law or render it vacuous, because the common law’s
normative force, says Pollock, comes not from any individual case, but because the
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“considered judgments of the higher tribunals” and the “general consent of leading
authorities.” It is the community of lawyers that creates the sort of stability that
enables law to become a scientific enterprise, i.e. making predictions about future
legal decisions possible.104 Though calling the common law “the custom of the realm”
had historical foundations, Pollock stated elsewhere, the custom in question had little
to do with “English custom in any popular sense,” but with “a specialised branch of
learning worked out by rule.”105 And so, unlike the American conception of the
common law, where a change in prevailing circumstances is itself deemed enough to
change a legal rule, in England that change must be shown to be derived from the
legal materials. And if this is (deemed) impossible, because, for example, the existing,
unsatisfactory, rule is well-established then there is nothing that can be done about
the matter, at least not until the legislature steps in and corrects the problem.106 As
Lord Goff once admitted “the House of Lords will not reverse a decision of its own
which is too young, or one which is too old, but only one which is, so to speak,
middle-aged.”107 While the reason for not upending a new decision is the familiar
concern with maintaining legal stability and certainty, his reasons for not overturning
old rules is highly revealing: “there is an underlying fear that a decision, if it stood for
many years, may have become so embedded in the mosaic of the law that to reverse it
would effect too great an upheaval of legal principle, or at least that the consequences
of its reversal cannot be wholly foreseen.”108 The Burkean version of conservatism
which I said underlay the practice-based conception of the common law is evident
here.
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(b) American Common Law as Will and Custom
While the idea of self-government never gained dominance in England, it is
implanted into American political DNA.109 Against this political background, adopting
English common law as the legal foundation for the United States was doubly
problematic. It was the law of a foreign nation, the very one against which Americans
fought for independence, and its underlying conception of authority was one that
clashed with the political sensibilities of the young republic. As a result, the American
adoption of English common law looks puzzling at first; but the puzzle is to a large
degree resolved when we see the way Americans have, from very early on, adapted
English common law to republican ideology. The American Revolution was, to some
extent, couched in terms of common law rights that have been denied, but the
adoption of English common law was immediately accompanied by adaptation to
American circumstances and politics. As Justice Story famously put it, “[t]he common
law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors
brought with them its general principles and claimed it as their birthright, but they
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their
situation.”110
The view that adopts certain common law rules only to the extent that it fits the
needs and conditions of the United States already reflects the beginning of a deeper
reworking of the underlying philosophy of the common law. In adopting English
common law, American writers emphasized a theme that was much less prominent in
English writings: rather than lawyers’ custom from time immemorial, the common law
reflected the people’s prevailing attitudes and norms at the time, and that it derived
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its authority from that fact.111 In fact, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the
willingness to change the content of common law rules to local needs was itself a
reflection of the fact that from the start, English common law was superimposed on
republican ideas of self-government, and it is this different theoretical foundation for
the common law enabled the Americans to start changing the English common law
fairly quickly.112
An interesting illustration of this development is seen in the American reception
of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. It is well known that for much of
the nineteenth century it was the most influential legal text in the United States.
This may seem to run strongly against my claim that the authority of the common law
was grounded in ideas of present-day custom, not least because Blackstone’s
Commentaries championed both Parliamentary (and not popular) sovereignty113 and the
idea that the common law as artificial reason.114 Interestingly, however, from fairly
early on Blackstone’s text was supplemented with detailed commentary adapting it
for American readers. Probably the most important of these glossators was St. George
Tucker, who added extensive comments and explanatory essays to the American
editions of Blackstone.115 One of the points of difference between the English and
the American Blackstone was that “[s]overeignty, in the sense meant by Blackstone,
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properly resided for Tucker only in the ‘People.’”116 On the basis of this philosophical
difference Tucker could add detailed discussions of the ways in which American
needs and environment necessitated changes from the English common law.117 This
difference remains to this day. Though the custom-based view is primarily a theory of
the common law’s authority, it is only within such an approach to the common law
that one will find a commentator suggesting that in developing the common law
courts should consult “popular sources, like newspapers and everyday
conversation”118 to determine the content of the common law.
Once the centrality of popular custom to American common law is understood,
various structural features of the judicial process can be seen as institutional solutions
designed to make sure the law reflects prevailing attitudes. For example, to most
outsiders the prevalence of elected judiciary in many American states seems a
baffling, even perverse, aspect of American law.119 But this practice looks much less
strange when one recognizes that judges are involved in lawmaking. If law gets its
authority from the fact that it reflects prevailing attitudes, and if it is acknowledged
that judges make law, then popular control over the judiciary (in the form of
elections) makes much sense: it introduces an institutional mechanism that may help
guarantee that the law as created and applied by the courts reflects popular attitudes.
Another device is the jury. Though jury trial is often named as one of the distinctive
features of the common law world, American law remains far more committed to it
than other common law jurisdictions. Part of the explanation for this fact is that in the
United States juries are perceived as a popular lawmaking institution, a way of
ensuring popular input into the process of lawmaking and a mechanism for checking
the judiciary’s development of the law.120
Holmes would have dismissed all this talk of the common law as empty piety. For
him, law, like life more generally, was a struggle for power,121 and earlier I mentioned
116
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his view, adopted by a United States Supreme Court majority in Erie, that presented
an unromantic will-based approach to all the law. This too may seem to conflict with
my characterization of American common law as custom-based. But the two
approaches can be aligned together by treating American sovereignty as residing in
the people.122 Though it does not take too much imagination (only a rudimentary
knowledge of American politics) to see how these two perspectives can come into
conflict, on the question of commonality they arrive at fairly similar conclusions. The
will-based view rejects commonality because all law is the product of sovereign
power; the customary view rejects commonality because all law reflects local
attitudes. The latter view could countenance commonality as long as there was reason
to think that the customs of England and of the United States were the same. But as
time went by there was less and less reason to think that. Perhaps more importantly,
even in those cases in which commonality would be found, it would be a coincidence,
not something to care much about and definitely not something to strive for. There is,
on this view, something suspicious about seeking affirmation for one community’s
local values and customs in the laws or attitudes of another. In the American context,
the view that such efforts really are nothing more than an attempt of an unelected
elite to force its values on “the people” is not a fringe claim: one finds it in the United
States Reports.123

(c) Some Anglo-American Differences Explained
Many of the differences between English and American common law become easier
to understand when the theoretical difference in understanding their respective basis
of authority is taken into account. I already mentioned the differences with regard to
elected judiciary and jury trial; here, I will mention a few others.124 As they all rely on
the preceding discussion, I can discuss them all relatively briefly.
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The common law and democracy. Perhaps the most striking difference between the
English and the American approaches is the relationship to democracy. American
common law is explained in terms of democracy, as a manifestation of democratic
principles; English common law is explained (and at times even justified) by its
defenders as a justified exception to democracy.125
In much American common law thinking law is seen as an important source for
the infusion of popularly-accepted norms into the law. These views about the
common law are part of a network of other ideas that see law as a popular product. For
example, there are many attempts to show the extent to which American
constitutional law (which in many respects resembles common law much more than
statutory law) moves with and is shaped by public opinion. On this view, there is a
bidirectional influence, or a dialogue, between courts and the people. First, though
courts play a significant role in the shaping of public policy, they are attentive to
popular opinion and are rarely out of tune with it. From the other direction, it has
been argued that courts play an active and useful role in instigating and fostering the
kind of debate that is seen as central to the functioning of a democracy founded on
ideas of self-government. This idea of a deliberative, participatory, democracy is much
more deeply ingrained in the American version of democracy.126 So understood, it is
easier to explain judicial review of legislation not as a departure from democratic
principles, but as an affirmation of popular democracy and an important feature of a
republican form of government. Ronald Dworkin, for example, stated that
[w]hen a constitutional issue has been decided by the Supreme Court, and is important
enough so that it can be expected to be elaborated, expanded, contracted, or even reversed,
by future decisions, a sustained national debate begins, in newspapers and other media, in
law schools and classrooms, in public meetings and around dinner tables. That debate better
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matches [the] conception of republican government, in its emphasis on matters of principle,
than almost anything the legislative process on its own is likely to produce.127

This idea is far less dominant in Britain, whose dominant conception of
democracy has been described as “democratic élitism,” which “restricts public
participation to a periodic take-it-or-leave-it choice between competing political
élites, [but otherwise] freeing the elected group to do as much as it will between
elections.”128 Against this conception, it is unsurprising that a prominent British judge
dismissed the idea that appellate courts should participate or encourage this kind of
public deliberation. “Professor Dworkin,” he wrote, “may enjoy the high level of
debate about Roe v Wade over the dinner table and with his taxi driver but I can do
without it. And the same goes for many other issues…which for better or for worse
have in this country been the subject of comprehensive legislation.”129 It is the
dominance of this perspective which explains why judicial review is still thought to
be in tension with Parliamentary supremacy, and to the extent that it is justified, is
justified in terms of the elitist conception of democracy, that is, as itself the product of
Parliamentary legislative choice.130
What is interesting is that in the American context, much of the opposition to
Dworkin’s ideas comes from the exact opposite direction, namely from critics who
think that something like his conception of constitutional law (together with its
justifications of judicial review) is insufficiently participatory. True self-government,
these critics say, means “popular constitutionalism,” a view that seeks to give a more
prominent role to “the people themselves” in the shaping of constitutional doctrine, a
view that implies “taking the constitution away from the court.”131
Codifying the common law. Much of American “common law” (if by this we mean
areas like contract and tort) is legislated. In a legal system in which common law and
legislation are simply seen as law, this is not thought of as remarkable. Indeed, the
opposite may well be the case. The idea that these areas of law have the status of law
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despite not being confirmed by a popularly-elected legislature may seem problematic,
and the unavailability of such laws to people an affront to the rule of law. The
prevalent hybrid approach (will for legislation, practice for the common law) in
England explains why common law and legislation are still treated like “oil and
water.”132 Here, the codification of the common law is seen as “dangerous.”133
American states, much more than the rest of the common law world, have codified
their common law areas of law. In the rest of the common law world there is, to this
day, resistance to codification (or, for that matter, even to more minor legislative
“interventions” in the common law). A likely (although rarely acknowledged) reason
for this resistance is that a codified common law will be much more naturally seen as
an act of will, laid down by the democratically-elected parliament, and binding only in
the country in which that legislative body enjoys political authority, and not as a
separate legal order, whose authority comes from some other source.134
The relationship of common law and statute. Closely related to the last point is the
question of the perceived relationship between the common law and statute. Unlike
English law, where for a long time the prevailing view has been that the common law
and statute law are two fairly independent bodies of law that are largely concerned
with different areas of law, operate on different principles, and should be generally
kept apart from each other, American law has been much quicker to embrace the idea
that judge-made and legislature-made law are simply two different ways of
lawmaking, and that they must be considered in tandem in dealing with legal
problems.135
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The force of precedent when circumstances change. In the United States it is common to
say that precedents lose their normative force when the social circumstances that
existed when they were formed disappear.136 English lawyers and judges are much
more reluctant to change deeply entrenched, very old, precedents,137 even though the
age of the precedent may be a strong indication that it was created at a time when
social circumstances were very different from what they currently are.
Legal scholarship. I mentioned briefly earlier the difference in style and content of
leading American and English legal journals and the nature of legal scholarship.
Especially in the context of common law subjects like contract or tort law, English
scholarship is far more doctrinal.138 To American legal scholars much of this
scholarship looks about a century out of date, but what this attitude cannot explain is
why such scholarship remains popular and why the allure of interdisciplinary
scholarship so resistible. There are numerous explanations for this phenomenon;
these include the diversity among the U.S. fifty jurisdictions as opposed to the
relative unity of these subjects in other common law jurisdictions where their highest
appellate courts provide fairly uniform solutions for the entire country; the
organization of the bar; and the different structure and culture of legal academia in
the United States as opposed to the rest of English-speaking world.139 While I do not
wish to dismiss these explanations, in my view these differences themselves can, at
least in part, be explained not as alternatives to the account offered here, but as the
product of the same differences in political ideology which form the core of my
argument. The practice-based approach encourages thinking of the common law as an
autonomous discipline, where answers to new problems must be sought from the
law’s own materials. From this perspective nondoctrinal scholarship is not simply
unnecessary; it is in some sense positively dangerous. By contrast, both the custombased and the will-based approaches will be far more open to nonlegal contributions.
I mentioned earlier that Rabban portrayed English and American legal history as
proceedings these days on “independent tracks,” despite considerable convergence in
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methods in the nineteenth century. Rabban made this claim as part of a broader
argument that has sought to challenge the perception of nineteenth century American
law and legal scholarship as formalist. Instead, he says, it is better described as
“historicist.” The argument presented here helps make sense of these claims. If my
argument is correct, the realists’ overthrow of “formalism” which is nowadays part of
American legal mythology, should be understood as a rejection of two distinct views
often conflated under the banner of “formalism,” the natural reason view and the
artificial reason view. Once we see that the label “formalism” is used to describe these
two often-confused views, we can refine the realists’ arguments. As I see it the
realists’ target was not the view that law must be derived deductively from abstract
legal principles, i.e. not as a rejection of the natural reason approach; the realists
challenged a historicist-elitist view and sought to replace it with a more presentistpopulist view. Even if not purely deductive, the view the realists have sought to
displace still saw law as an elitist, apolitical, and arcane science. Properly understood,
then, Rabban’s account is not a challenge to the familiar story about the realists’
critique of Langdellian formalism, it is an affirmation of it.
Furthermore, we can now also make sense of the divergence Rabban described
among the practices of contemporary legal historians. It is notable that many of the
American legal historians Rabban discussed had strong links with Harvard Law
School, where the practice-based conception of the authority of the common law was
dominant at the time. This view lends itself to the kind of “internal,” doctrinal, legal
history, one that examines changes in the law by more-or-less exclusive focus on
“traditional” legal materials (cases, treatises, textbooks etc.) in relative isolation of
discussion of the relationship between law and society. That is why there could be a
meaningful transatlantic conversation between them.
Against the background of a continuing dominance of law as artificial reason in
England, it is unsurprising that a “closed” kind of legal history is still dominant in
England.140 With the custom-based approach (re-)asserting itself in the United States,
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change. It is notable, however, that the complaint was not that legal scholars should pay more attention
to the way societal changes affect legal doctrine. Rather, it was that legal scholars should pay more
attention to the complexity of the internal legal mechanisms that influence the law. For example,
“judgments should not be seen as free-standing artefacts, independent of the processes of production
that have given rise to them. Rather,…the law report of a case is an imperfect and incomplete record of
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this approach to legal history fell out of favor. Instead of tracing law through changing
doctrine, law came to be seen as a reflection of prevailing attitudes of the day, and
correspondingly American legal history became much more interested in studying
changes in legal doctrine not in relation to path-dependent but isolated legal doctrine,
but much more in relation to the contemporaneous social attitudes. This explains why
the dominant approaches to legal history writing in the two countries are now rather
different. The very different ways in which English and American legal historians see
their subject-matter thus reflects different understandings of the authority of the
common law.
Federalism and the common law. As just mentioned, differences in legal scholarship
have been explained in terms of the different form of federalism in the United States
on the one hand, and other federal common law countries such as Australia and
Canada. Arguably, however, this difference is itself an aspect of the ideological
difference offered in this essay. (As my focus in this essay is on the differences
between the United States and England, I will not explore this point in any detail.)
The American version of federalism countenances, and to some extent even
celebrates, different common laws for the different states. It is notable, that Australia
and Canada are far more committed to a national common law,141 something that may
possibly be explained by the fact that the practice-based view has been far more
dominant in these countries.

(d) Explaining the Decline in Anglo-American Commonality: The New Puzzle
Following what I have said in this section the question of the divergence between
English and American common law may now appear in a different light. The right
question may seem to be not why commonality declined but why it ever existed. For
if I am right, the American conception of the common law should have been
unsympathetic to outside contributions from the start. The custom-based view could
rely on customs of other countries when those could be thought to be similar to
American ones, but these days, this is a problematic assumption. From the other side,
there is a different kind of problem with maintaining commonality, perhaps less
acute, but still significant. The practice-based approach is based on a fairly strong
separation between law and politics. It is, in fact, this separation that allows for
when discussing legislative changes that happened in response to external pressures, Mitchell complains
that such changes “strike[] a dissonant note when placed next to more general, common law principles.”
Id. at 191. In short, such changes are problematic because they undermine the image of law that the
practice-based scholar seeks to cultivate.
141
See Leslie Zines, The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature and Constitutional Significance, 32 FED. L.
REV. 337, 344–51 (2004) (the dominant view in Australia accepts a “common law of Australia”); 1 PETER
W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 8.5(a), at 8-12 (5th ed. 2007) (“the Supreme Court of
Canada does not tolerate divergences in the common law from province to province”).
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borrowing from other the common law of other countries. But as American common
law itself is conceived of in political terms, relying on its solutions may seem more
problematic for its potential to “taint” the seemingly apolitical common law.
Why then did Dicey speak of Anglo-American commonality and of the similarity
between the two countries’ laws in such enthusiastic terms? Did he not notice the
differences?142 My answer is twofold. First, to understand Dicey’s remarks we need to
understand the wider political context in which they were made. Second, American
common law at the time, especially in the form with which Dicey was most familiar,
embraced ideas that brought it closer to the practice-based conception. I will consider
these two points in turn.
The period around the turn of the twentieth century, is known as the period of
the “great rapprochement” between the United States and Britain. This AngloAmerican alliance was conceived as a counterbalance to the rising forces of Germany
and France.143 Coincidentally or not, this diplomatic rapprochement was accompanied
by an ideological one. Some academic liberals (in the nineteenth-century sense of the
term) came to see the United States as a living beacon of a society committed to
English (or Anglo-Saxon) freedom grounded in the common law.144 Dicey, along with
several other Oxford professors, was part of that group, and was in fact not alone in
suggesting some kind of political unity, or even joint citizenship, between the two
countries. Around the same time James Bryce, a former Regius Professor of Civil Law
at Oxford and future British ambassador to the United States, made a similar
suggestion,145 and similar ideas were expressed with relative frequency by others at
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One could even say that he dismissed them. Almost two decades before the essay which I quoted
in the beginning, Dicey wrote: “That [American] law is founded on that of England is common
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extent than might have been anticipated changed either the substance or the form of the legal rules
brought from the old country.” A.V. Dicey, An English View of American Conservatism, 30 NATION 228, 229
(1880). I will argue that Dicey was wrong here; or if not wrong when he wrote it, that within a few
decades republican ideas have changed the American conception of the common law.
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STATES 1895–1914 (1968); CHARLES S. CAMPBELL, FROM REVOLUTION TO RAPPROCHEMENT: THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1783–1900, at 191–204 (1974).
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For some relevant context see H.A. Tulloch, Changing British Attitudes towards the United States in
the 1880s, 20 HIST. J. 825 (1977).
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the time, and not just on the Eastern side of the Atlantic.146 Nevertheless, it appears
to have been an elite affair, not something that excited the general public. A year after
the publication of his original plea for “isopolity,” Dicey reported that his “proposal
fell flat,” that “[i]t excited no attention in England,” and that the tone of the “few
friendly letters from the United States…was not encouraging.”147 In part, therefore,
Dicey’s claims about the similarities between the two legal systems should be read in
relation to his politics, rather than as a dispassionate presentation of reality.
In fairness to Dicey, it seems like his claims were not a figment of his imagination.
Dicey’s main contacts and sources of information about American law were from his
correspondences and meetings with members of the faculty of Harvard Law School.
And it seems that when he spoke of the similarity between the law of the United
States and England, he was in some sense talking more about the similarity between
the law professors at Harvard and Oxford, a fairly short-lived connection forged
between the two law schools in the late nineteenth century.148
In both institutions a central question at the time was how to justify the study of
law in a research university. To justify the academic instruction to a profession
traditionally taught by way of apprenticeship, it had to be shown that the study of law
could be “scientific.” Germany, where the modern research university was invented,
provided a model.149 The problem was that German legal science at the time was
dominated by the natural reason model, which was alien to common lawyers’ thinking
and to the dominant role they gave to cases. Instead of the rationalistic inquiry, more
geometrico demonstrata, that was the staple of the German legal science, the common
law version of legal science favored an inductive study that started with the cases and
tried to identify underlying doctrines and principles implicit in them. This is the
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version of legal science championed by Langdell at Harvard at the time,150 and it is
the model defended by Dicey in his Inaugural Lecture to the Vinerian Chair at
Oxford: “By adequate study and careful thought whole departments of law can thus
be reduced to order and exhibited under the form of a few principles which sum up
the effect of a hundred cases.”151 The scientific analogy was less deductive geometry,
more inductive botanical classification.152
Legal science at both Oxford and Harvard thus meant something close to the
practice-based view of the common law. The law’s principles were not simply a
reflection of popular attitudes: for those there was no need for a careful study of the
cases in the library, the lawyer’s laboratory.153 The practice-based approach could be
considered scientific by advancing a conception of law as a form of expertise properly
reserved for trained elites. Their training consisted in learning to discover the
principles of the common law.154 It was is the validity of these principles, embedded
in the long history of the common law, that guaranteed its separation from the sway of
contemporary politics; and it was this separation of law from politics that guaranteed
the law’s scientific objectivity.
In the United States, legal practice became more professional and “formal” in the
course of the nineteenth century;155 and Harvard Law School provided a model for
the rest of American legal education on the right approach to educating this upwardly
mobile profession. It is this image that many of those who passed through law school
at the time (either at Harvard or in other leading law schools) that help foster the
Anglo-American common law alliance described in the beginning of this essay.
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This conception of the common law functioned reasonably well for a while, with
the practice-based conception of the common law helping to work out a fairly
internally coherent legal doctrine. But this conception came under increasing
pressure on both sides of the Atlantic with the growth of the administrative state. And
because of the two countries’ different political traditions, they reacted very
differently to it. American common lawyers worked to bring together common law
and statute, showing how both can be seen as a product of a self-governing people; in
England, the response was by insisting on a clear separation between the two,
maintaining the common law as a kind of lawyer’s law that should be kept free from
“political” interventions, while statute was the product of the sovereign.156 An
emphasis on the democratic nature of the contemporary custom conception of the
common law was part and parcel of that response. This is the key to understanding
the realist attack on Langdell and Harvard Law School, and perhaps even more than
that, its success.157 For Karl Llewellyn in particular, this opposition was not at all a
challenge to the study of law through cases, nor was it a critique of the common law.158
It was a challenge to the perception that the practice-based way of teaching the cases
reflected a misguided philosophy of the common law, one that was both alien to the
American common law tradition and was normatively unappealing.

IV. Conclusion
The body of materials we call “common law” has been in existence for so long and in
so many places, and benefited from the contributions of so many people that it would
have been incredible if we found it perfectly coherent. This fact is usually invoked to
explain the messiness of common law doctrine, but in this essay I suggested that it is
also relevant for understanding the common law’s theoretical foundations. What I
have attempted to show is that this theoretical messiness helps us understand various
seemingly disparate questions. I have further sought to show that these differences
can ultimately be traced to seemingly unrelated questions about the relationship
between law and politics, about the basis of political authority, and even the meaning
and role of democracy.
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That ideas, including political ideas, matter to understanding law is not a
groundbreaking claim. Once again, in the context of particular legal rules, this idea is
trivial. We fully expect, for example, a more conservative society to have more
conservative laws. What I have attempted to show is that political ideas are relevant
also for understanding the underlying philosophy of the common law, and that
different political ideas will lead to different common law practice. Even at the more
abstract level of the structure of legal institutions the claim, in some sense, is rather
familiar. The dichotomy between “realism” and “formalism” has served to show how
ideas influence central features of the practice. Unfortunately, this dichotomy is far
too crude for providing an adequately nuanced account of the underlying ideologies
of the common law. I have attempted to show that the four different ideal-types
presented in this essay—reason, practice, custom, and will—as well as some potential
combinations of them, provide a better way of understanding the familiar but littlediscussed divergences in what is still considered one of the unifying characteristics of
the English-speaking world.
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